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Abstract 
Integrating terror management theory and objective self-awareness theory, we propose the 
existential escape hypothesis, which states that people with low self-esteem should be 
especially prone to escaping self-awareness as a distal response to thoughts of death. This is 
because they lack the means to bolster the self as a defense, and the propensity to bolster the 
self reduces the motivation to escape from self-awareness. Five studies supported this 
hypothesis. Individuals low, but not high, in self-esteem scored lower on a measure of private 
self-awareness (Study 1), showed less implicit self-activation (Studies 2 & 3), were more 
likely to choose to write about others than themselves (Study 4), and consumed more alcohol 
in a field study at a nightclub (Study 5) in response to mortality reminders. Implications for 
terror management theory (highlighting an additional route to defend against mortality 
awareness), self-regulation, physical health and well-being are discussed. 
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The Role of Self-esteem and Self-related Cognition in Terror Management 
   
“Modern (wo)-man is drinking and drugging himself out of awareness, or he spends his time 
shopping, which is the same thing. As awareness calls for types of heroic dedication that his 
culture no longer provides for him, society contrives to help him forget.”  
Becker, 1973 
Cultural anthropologist Ernest Becker (1973) posited that the capacity to reflect on the self 
poses a problem for human beings—the awareness of the existence of the self signifies that 
the self can also cease to exist. One way to address this problem is to employ symbolic, 
cultural, solutions that imbue life with meaning, and the conviction that the self in some way 
or the other extends beyond death (Psyzczynski, Greenberg, Solomon, Arndt & Schimel, 
2004). Numerous studies, inspired by terror management theory (TMT; Greenberg 
Pyszczynski & Solomon, 1986), support the assertion that symbolic solutions (e.g., self-
esteem, worldviews) protect people from the psychological threat posed by the awareness of 
mortality. However, the much more direct role of shutting down self-awareness, or ‘losing’ 
the self, as a means of coping with mortality concerns (Becker, 1973; Wisman, 2006) has 
received considerably less empirical attention.  
 
According to objective self-awareness (OSA) theory (Duval & Wicklund, 1972) 
people are especially motivated to escape self-awareness when they do not believe that they 
can reduce the discrepancies between who they are and who they feel they should be or want 
to be. Integrating TMT and objective self-awareness (OSA) theory (Duval & Wicklund, 
1972), we propose and test the existential escape hypothesis (Wisman, 2006), which posits 
that non-conscious reminders of mortality motivate an ‘escape’ from the self/self-awareness, 
but only among people with lower levels of self-esteem. When reminded of death, people 
with low self-esteem are less prone to bolstering the self (Landau & Greenberg, 2006) and are 
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more likely to experience a range of psychological maladjustments, such as heightened 
negative affect, reduced hope, and reduced belief that life is meaningful (Juhl & Routledge, 
2014; Routledge et al., 2010; Wisman & Heflick, 2015). Thus, low self-esteem individuals 
should be especially prone to escape the self when thinking about death. We report herein 
five studies consistent with the existential escape hypothesis. 
Symbolic Ways to Manage Existential Awareness 
Becker argued in The Denial of Death (1973) that the paradox of the human 
condition, a predisposition for self-preservation coupled with the pervasive awareness of the 
self and its eventual and inescapable demise, is at the core of human motivation. In response 
to this paradox, humans created elaborate systems of meaning and value (i.e., cultures) that 
provide symbolic immortality or literal immortality, and a pathway of cultural standards by 
which to obtain self-esteem. Thus, it is through culture, and the meaning and immortality it 
provides, that humans cope with mortality awareness. 
Based on the writings of Becker and other existential thinkers, TMT provides a 
systematic analysis of how humans manage the existential terror that can spring from the 
awareness of personal mortality (Greenberg, Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1997). According to 
TMT, individuals manage the problem of personal death awareness through two types of 
defenses: proximal and distal. With proximal (immediate) defenses people aim to suppress 
thoughts of their personal mortality (e.g. “I am not going to think about this stuff”), distract 
themselves from death thoughts (e.g. “Lovely weather indeed”), or downplay the importance 
of the problem (e.g. “I will die; so what?”). Proximal defenses work by removing the problem 
of death from consciousness temporarily (Arndt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski & Simon, 
1997). However, proximal defenses do not provide a solution to the problem of death 
awareness. As research demonstrates, after individuals employ proximal defenses, death-
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related thoughts are still accessible outside conscious awareness (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, 
Solomon, Simon, & Breus, 1994).  
In contrast to proximal defenses, distal defenses occur outside focal attention (e.g., in 
an experimental paradigm, when a delay follows the explicit contemplation of death or when 
death is primed subliminally), and aim to provide a symbolic solution to the problem of 
mortality awareness. According to TMT, humans acquire symbolic solutions to the problem 
of death by living up to the standards and values championed by their culture. Specifically, 
the management of terror is posited to occur via a symbolic defense system. In this system, 
culturally constructed views of the world (worldviews) provide protection by offering a sense 
of meaning and, importantly, an avenue to symbolic immortality for individuals who uphold 
cultural standards (Greenberg et al., 1997). People who perceive themselves as living up to 
these meaning-conferring cultural standards (i.e., people with high self-esteem) are part of 
something significant and lasting, and thereby transcend concerns about mortality. Thus, it is 
through these distal defenses that death-related thoughts are eliminated (Pyszczynski et al., 
2004). 
The majority of TMT studies have focused on the mortality salience hypothesis. This 
hypothesis states that if worldviews and self-esteem buffer non-conscious concerns about 
mortality, activating an awareness of mortality (outside of focal attention, at a distal level) 
should increase reliance on these structures. In support of the mortality salience hypothesis, 
increases in worldview defense and self-esteem striving are routinely observed as a distal 
defense to mortality awareness (see Burke, Martens & Faucher, 2010, for review). For 
instance, mortality salience promotes ingroup humanization and favoritism (Castano, 2004; 
Vaes, Heflick & Goldenberg, 2010), more punitive judgments of people who violate cultural 
norms (Florian & Mikulncer, 1997), and increased disagreement with anti-nationalist essays 
(Greenberg et al., 2003). People even increase their intentions to engage in behaviors with 
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clear health risk (e.g., tanning), if the behavior is associated with self-esteem (Goldenberg & 
Arndt, 2008; Routledge, Arndt & Goldenberg, 2004).  
TMT (Pyszczynski, Greenberg & Solomon, 1999) also posits the death thought 
accessibility hypothesis, which states that to the extent that worldviews and self-esteem 
function to buffer mortality concerns, strengthening these structures should reduce non-
conscious death-related thoughts, and weakening these structures should increase them. In 
one series of studies, individuals who highly identified with their nation showed increased 
death thought accessibility after reading an essay that criticized their nation (Schimel, Hayes, 
Williams, & Jahrig, 2007). Similar effects have been found when self-esteem is challenged 
(Hayes, Schimel & Williams, 2008a), and when Christians read essays criticizing the Bible 
(Friedman & Rholes, 2008). Conversely, defending one’s values, or even hearing that people 
with opposing worldviews have died, decreases the accessibility of death thoughts (Hayes, 
Schimel & Williams, 2008b; Schmeichel & Martens, 2005).  
Consistent with research depicting self-esteem as a resource that insulates individuals 
from psychological threats (e.g., Brown, 2010; Taylor, Lerner, Sherman, Sage, & McDowell, 
2003), research on the anxiety buffer hypothesis in TMT suggests that high self-esteem 
provides protection from defensiveness in response to thoughts of death. In an initial test of 
this hypothesis, when self-esteem was boosted by giving participants positive feedback on a 
personality test, they reported less anxiety in response to graphic video depictions of death 
(Greenberg et al., 1992) and less propensity to deny that death could come early in their life 
(Greenberg et al., 1993). Research also demonstrates that people low, but not high, in self-
esteem experience heightened negative affect when reminded of death (Routledge et al., 
2010; Wisman & Heflick, 2015), and self-esteem is negatively correlated with death anxiety 
across the lifespan (Cicereli, 2001; Davis, Martin, Wilee & Vorhees, 1978), and cross-
culturally (Du et al., 2013). In addition, Harmon-Jones et al. (1997) demonstrated that 
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experimentally enhanced, and high trait, self-esteem is associated with less death thought 
accessibility in response to reminders of one’s mortality, as compared to a moderate self-
esteem condition.   
Mortality and Losing the Self: Existing Research 
Because the capacity to reflect on the self enables mortality awareness, Arndt, 
Greenberg, Simon, Pyszczynski and Solomon (1998) hypothesized that people would avoid 
self-focus when death thoughts are in current focal awareness, as this serves to distract 
people, albeit temporarily, from thoughts of death. Supporting this, participants spent less 
time writing about their mortality in a cubicle that contained a mirror (a validated self-
awareness induction, cf. Duval & Wicklund, 1972) compared to one that did not; and 
immediately after being primed with mortality they spent less time on a writing task that 
prompted an internal focus of awareness compared to one that prompted an external focus. 
Similarly, it was shown that participants who were seated in a cubicle that contained a mirror 
reported more death related cognition than participants sitting in a cubicle without the mirror 
(Silvia, 2001). These and other studies suggest that self-awareness may be particular aversive 
in the context of mortality salience and people may avoid self-awareness as a proximal 
defense against conscious death thoughts (Arndt et al., 1998; Silva, 2001).  
We suggest that, under some conditions, people may be motivated to escape the self 
as a distal defense, that is, when thoughts about death are accessible but not in conscious 
awareness. Providing indirect support for this notion, eating, which can function as self-
escape behavior (Heatherton & Baumeister, 1991), has been found to reduce the effects of 
mortality salience on worldview defense (Hirschberger & Ein-Dor, 2005). Specifically, 
participants who were not offered food showed more severe judgments of social 
transgressions (a typical measure of symbolic worldview defense) when primed with 
mortality as compared to a control condition; in contrast, the effect was reversed for those 
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who ate sweet, pleasant tasting food (i.e., candy). In addition, a wide range of classic social 
psychology studies (Diener, 1979; Milgram, 1974; Mullen, 1991; Zimbardo, 1973) 
demonstrate that group immersion can reduce self-awareness, as people become less focused 
on (the potential for) negative social evaluations (Mann, Newton, & Innes, 1982). Thus, that 
reminders of mortality promote a tendency to sit within a group, as opposed to sitting alone, 
is also consistent with the proposition that people may escape the self as a distal defense 
(Wisman & Koole, 2003).  
In summary then, although these studies were not designed to directly test the 
proposition that reminders of mortality increase behaviors and cognitions that are associated 
with escaping the self at a distal level, they are consistent with this position.  
The Existential Escape Hypothesis 
We posit that people can employ two fundamentally different strategies to distally 
regulate awareness of personal mortality. First, as extensively shown by TMT research to 
date, individuals can use the symbolic self (e.g. cultural worldviews, self-esteem) as a distal 
defense to reminders of mortality. Second, there is evidence consistent with the possibility 
that reminders of mortality may increase behavior and cognitions that help to lose the self as 
an alternative distal defense. But, when and which people ‘use’ or ‘lose’ the symbolic self to 
reduce existential concerns? OSA theory (Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 
1981; 1982) and the related self-discrepancy theory (Higgins, 1987) provide an explanatory 
framework for answering this question.  
According to OSA theory, when people become aware of themselves as an object of 
evaluation, they become more aware of the discrepancies between their actual self and the 
standards set for the self (see also Higgins, 1987). This discrepancy, in turn, arouses negative 
affect (Mor & Windquist, 2002), which motivates individuals to either avoid self-awareness 
or reduce the discrepancy. When the discrepancies are large, or people feel unable to reduce 
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the discrepancies, people are more likely to avoid self-awareness (Duval, Duval & Mulilis, 
1992; see also, Carver & Scheier, 1981).  Indeed, when individuals experience a situational 
threat to their self-esteem (e.g., negative feedback on their performance) they attempt to 
escape self-awareness, for example, by avoiding mirrors (Duval & Wicklund, 1972), and 
removing the focus from the self with activities, such as watching television (Moskalenko & 
Heine, 2003). As self-awareness intensifies negative mood states (Mor & Windquist, 2002; 
Phillips, & Silvia, 2005), self-awareness may also be especially aversive to people with low 
self-esteem, as low self-esteem is axiomatically associated with negative affect (Brockner, 
1983). Moreover, whenever the self is accessible (e.g., private self-awareness) people with 
low self-esteem are more likely to experience negative self-discrepancies (Cheng et al., 2012; 
Ickes Wicklund & Ferris, 1972; Pysczycynski & Greenberg, 1987). In view of this, perhaps 
not surprisingly, low self-esteem (dispositional and manipulated) in conjunction with self-
awareness has also been implicated in escape behaviors such as binge eating (e.g., Polivy, 
Heatherton, & Herman, 1988; Heatherton, Herman, & Polivy, 1991) and drinking alcohol 
(Hull & Young, 1983). Thus, people with low self-esteem are prone to coping with the 
burden of negative self-discrepancies by escaping self-awareness (losing the self). In contrast, 
people with high self-esteem experience less negative self-discrepancies (Barnett, Wornack, 
& Palee, 2015), and according to OSA theory, are therefore  more likely to cope by 
attempting to narrow the self-discrepancies (using the self). 
In a similar vein, when people ponder their personal mortality they may become 
aware of the discrepancy between their desire to live and the knowledge that they must die. 
We call the desire to live and the unique human ability to understand that life is finite an 
existential discrepancy. From the perspective of TMT, people reduce this discrepancy with 
increased efforts to live up to self-relevant, culturally derived standards. There is evidence 
though that self-enhancement and worldview defense in response to mortality reminders are 
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defenses employed more frequently among people with high explicit self-esteem (Juhl & 
Routledge, 2014; Landau & Greenberg, 2006; McGregor, Gailliot, Vasquez & Nash, 2007; 
Schmeichel et al., 2009). Moreover, people that lack self-esteem in a certain self-aspect, such 
as driving or their physical appearance, do not identify more with that construct when 
reminded of death (Goldenberg, McCoy, Greenberg, Pyszczynski & Solomon, 2000; 
Taubman Ben-Ari, Florian & Mikulincer, 1999). As low self-esteem is associated with less 
perceived self-competence and self-liking (Taforadi & Swann, 1995), it is likely that low 
self-esteem individuals have fewer self-related domains to bolster the self with when coping 
with mortality concerns.  
Consistent with evidence that people high in self-esteem more successfully employ 
distal defenses involving self- and worldview enhancement, Routledge et al. (2010) found in 
a series of eight experiments that people low (but not high) in self-esteem take a hit to their 
psychological well-being at a distal level in response to non-conscious mortality reminders. 
Low self-esteem (measured or manipulated) in conjunction with mortality reminders led to 
decreased satisfaction with life, subjective vitality, meaning in life, and exploration, and 
increased negative affect, state anxiety, and social avoidance. Individuals with low, but not 
high, self-esteem also experience reduced hope (Wisman & Heflick, 2015) and heightened 
search for meaning in life (Juhl & Routledge, 2014) distally when pondering their own 
mortality. 
Thus, from the perspective of OSA theory, people with high self-esteem are more 
likely to strive to reduce the discrepancy between their actual selves and their standards, 
whereas people low in self-esteem are more likely to avoid self-awareness. And, according to 
TMT research, people with low self-esteem are not only are less insulated from the effects of 
mortality salience (i.e., have less of an anxiety buffer against mortality salience, e.g., 
Harmon-Jones et al., 1997; Routledge et al., 2010), but they also do not as readily self-
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enhance in response to mortality salience (e.g., Landau & Greenberg, 2006), and therefore are 
often left without a clear way to regulate existential concerns. Thus, bridging OSA theory and 
TMT paves the way for a novel TMT hypothesis: the existential escape hypothesis (Wisman, 
2006), which states that people low in self-esteem are likely to increase cognitions and 
behaviors that are directed at “shutting down” the self and escaping self-awareness in 
response to reminders of their own mortality.
 
  
The Current Research and Hypotheses 
 We conducted five studies to examine the existential escape hypothesis. Studies 1-4 
examined self-awareness, and the motivation to escape it, using an explicit self-awareness 
scale (Studies 1), implicit self-activation (Studies 2 & 3) and a decision task to write about 
the self or another person (Study 4). Study 5 explored a behavioral ramification of existential 
escape—alcohol consumption—in a field study at a nightclub. Alcohol consumption reduces 
distress and general self-awareness, and as such, has been implicated as an escape behavior 
(e.g., Hull, Levenson, Young, & Sher, 1983). In contrast, individuals with high self-esteem 
were not expected to show any such effects, consistent with the notion that they are more 
capable of using the symbolic self to cope with mortality concerns. All five experiments were 
conducted in accordance with APA standards for the ethical treatment of human participants, 
and gained the prior approval by the Ethics Committee of the Institute. Written consent was 
obtained from all participants involved in these experiments. Participants were all fully 
debriefed.
 1
  
Study 1 
Study 1 was designed to provide a first test of the existential escape hypothesis, which 
states that only people with low self-esteem will show reduced self-awareness in response to 
mortality salience. A well validated measure of private self-awareness was used to test self-
awareness at a conscious, explicit level.  
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Method 
Participants  
Sixty-nine undergraduate students from the University of Kent (60 women and 9 men, 
Mage = 20.13) participated for course credit in a study ostensibly concerned with the 
relationship among personality characteristics.  
Procedure and Materials  
Participants completed materials in a laboratory on a standard PC equipped with 
Authorware 7.1 software. After a couple of filler questionnaires participants were presented 
with the Rosenberg Self-esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965), which measures global feelings 
about the self with 10 items such as, “I take a positive attitude toward myself,” and “I 
certainly feel useless at times” (reversed). Responses are assessed using a 5-point agreement 
format, where 1 = strongly disagree, and 5 = strongly agree. In a review of major measures 
of self-esteem (Blascovich & Tomaka, 1991), Rosenberg’s Self-esteem Scale was found to 
have excellent psychometric properties, such as internal consistency, test-retest reliability, 
and convergent and discriminant validities (in Study 1;  = .89; M = 3.62, SD = .62).  
Following the assessment of self-esteem, participants were then randomly assigned to 
a mortality salience or control condition (e.g., Rosenblatt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, 
& Lyon, 1989). In the mortality salience condition, participants responded to two open-ended 
questions: “Briefly describe the emotions that the thought of your own death arouses in you” 
and “Jot down, as specifically as you can, what you think will happen to you physically as 
you die and once you are physically dead.” The control condition consisted of two parallel 
items regarding the experience of intense physical pain so as to compare mortality salience 
with the salience of another aversive topic. 
 Next participants received the 20-item Positive and Negative Affect Schedule 
(PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) in order examine immediate effects of self-
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esteem and mortality salience on mood, directly after the experimental induction, and to 
provide a delay so that thoughts of death recede from consciousness (Arndt et al., 1997). 
Specifically, they indicated the extent to which each of 10 positive affect items (e.g., 
attentive;  = .89; M = 2.38, SD = 0.73) and 10 negative affect items (e.g., angry; ( = .76; M 
=1.47, SD = 0.44) reflected how they felt right at that moment (1 = very slightly or not at all, 
5 = extremely). After the mood measurement, to further enable thoughts of death to recede 
from consciousness (Arndt, Greenberg, Pyszczynski & Solomon, 1997), participants also 
completed a simple and short dot-to-dot task in which they drew lines to connect numbered 
dots creating an image of a tree. 
 Finally, for the dependent variable, participants completed the Situational Self-
Awareness Scale (SSAS; Govern & Marsch, 2001). The SSAS is a 9-item scale comprised of 
three factors: private self-awareness, public self-awareness, and attention to the situation, 
which has been used in dozens of studies. Our hypothesis was specific to private self-
awareness because this is the type of self-awareness with which theories of self-regulation, 
like OSA theory, are concerned (Fejfar & Hoyle, 2000; Silvia, 2015). In contrast to public 
awareness (e.g., “I am concerned about what other people think of me”) and situational 
awareness (e.g., “I am conscious of all objects around me”), the private self-awareness 
subscale directly taps into internally focused self-related thoughts independent of external 
influences (situational awareness and public awareness only correlate .3 to .4 with the private 
scale; Govern & Marsch, 2001). Specifically, we averaged participants’ agreement (1 = 
strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree) with three items reflecting private self-awareness (e.g., 
“Right now I am aware of my innermost thoughts,” “Right now I am reflective about my 
life,” and “Right now I am very conscious of my inner feelings;” M = 2.99, SD = .85). This 
scale had sufficient reliability ( = .73)  
Results 
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First, we examined the effects of mortality salience and self-esteem on positive and 
negative affect. We found no effects involving mortality salience or the interaction between 
mortality salience and self-esteem (ps > .8), but did find a main effect of self-esteem on 
positive affect (lower self-esteem was associated with less of it, B =.42, SE = 1.36, t(66) = 
3.03, p < .005) and negative affect (lower self-esteem was associated with more of it, B = -
.32, SE = .08, t(66)  = -4.15, p < .001). Importantly, the results below are not altered when 
including positive and negative affect as covariates.
2
 
To test the primary hypothesis that individuals with low self-esteem, in contrast to 
individuals with higher levels of self-esteem, would decrease private self-awareness as a 
function of mortality salience, we conducted regression analysis in which we entered the 
main effects for the mortality salience manipulation dummy coded, and self-esteem 
(centered) in the first Step and the interaction at Step 2. No effects approached significance at 
Step 1, ps > .27. At Step 2, we observed the hypothesized self-esteem by mortality salience 
interaction, B = -.1, SE =.03, t(65) = -3.06, p = .003, adjusted R
2
 = .13 (see Figure 1). To 
deconstruct the interaction we examined the predicted mean comparisons at one standard 
deviation above and below the standardized self-esteem mean. Consistent with the existential 
escape hypothesis, at low levels of trait self-esteem, mortality salience decreased private self-
awareness, relative to the control condition, B = -.78, SE = 0.28, t(65) = -2.83, p = .006, 
whereas at high levels of trait self-esteem, there was no significant effect of mortality 
salience, B = 0.42, SE = 0.28, t(65) = 1.52, p = .13 (with the pattern of means in the opposite 
direction). We also observed that, in the control condition, low trait self-esteem was 
associated with higher private self awareness, relative to high self-esteem, B = -.06, SE = .02, 
t(65) = -2.95, p = .004, a difference that was not observed when mortality was rendered 
salient, B = .03, SE = .02, t(65) = 1.42, p = .16.   
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We replicated the analysis on the two other subscales of the SSAS: public self-
awareness and situational awareness. We observed one main effect of self-esteem for public 
self-awareness: lower self-esteem predicted higher levels of public self-awareness, B = -.07, 
SE =.02, t(66) = -3.65, p = .001. No other effects approached significance (ps > .8), and 
critically, self-esteem did not interact with mortality salience for either of subscale (ps > .3).  
Discussion 
 The findings of Study 1 provide support for the existential escape hypothesis: 
Reminders of mortality decreased private self-awareness relative to the control condition, but 
only for participants with low self-esteem. In the absence of morality salience, we also 
observed a tendency for participants with low self-esteem to exhibit higher levels of private 
self-awareness than participants with high self-esteem. Though not explicitly hypothesized, it 
makes sense that people with low trait self-esteem generally show heightened negative self-
awareness, presumably as a function of negative self discrepancies (Cheng et al., 2012; Ickes 
Wicklund & Ferris, 1972; Pysczycynski & Greenberg, 1987; see also Silvia et al., 2011). In a 
similar vein, independent of the mortality salience prime, individuals with low self-esteem 
showed higher levels of public self-awareness suggesting that they were relatively more 
concerned with others people’s thoughts and opinions of them. However, as expected, it was 
the internalized focus on the self, or private self-awareness, that individuals shifted their 
attention away from in response to mortality salience.  
Moreover, these effects were not accounted for by positive and negative affect 
assessed immediately after the manipulation. We hasten to note that these findings do not 
preclude the possibility of negative affect as a distal response (Routledge et al., 2010); but 
relevant to the current framework, low self-esteem individuals under mortality salience were 
not presumably escaping self-awareness due to proximal changes in mood caused by thinking 
about their own death. This is consistent with hundreds of TMT studies demonstrating that 
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affect is not impacted as an immediate response to mortality salience, and that affect does not 
mediate distal outcomes in response to mortality salience (e.g., Greenberg et al., 2003; 
Landau et al., 2004).  
Study 2 
Study 1 was the first study to our knowledge to directly demonstrate that individuals 
low self-esteem response to non-conscious death thoughts with efforts to escape self-
awareness. The aim of Study 2 is to replicate this finding using a more implicit measurement 
of self-related cognition (Silvia et al., 2013). To this end, we employed the Linguistic 
Implications Form (LIF; Wegner & Giuliano, 1980, 1983), a widely-used scale that measures 
state self-focus via how often people complete ambiguous sentences with first-person 
singular pronouns (Silvia et al., 2013; Snow et al., 2004). 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 98 North American users of Amazon Mturk (66 female; Mage = 
40.02, SD = 13.65) who received $0.40 for participating in a study described as a personality 
study.  
Procedure and Materials 
Participants completed materials online. The materials were the same as Study 1, with 
a couple of exceptions. After self-esteem was assessed ( = .92; M = 3.78, SD = .88), 
mortality salience was primed as in Study 1, but the comparison control condition involved 
answering two questions about visiting the dentist. Next, after the PANAS mood scale ( = 
.92; M = 2.98, SD = 0.93 for positive affect;  = .93; M =1.56, SD = 0.78 for negative affect), 
participants read a short story called ‘The Growing Stone’ by the French existentialist Albert 
Camus. This introduced an even longer delay compared to Study 1, assuring that responses 
represent distal defenses (Martens, Burke, Schimel, & Faucher, 2011).  
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 We then measured state self-focussed attention with a short version of the LIF 
(Wegner & Giuliano, 1980, 1983). The LIF presents participants with 10 incomplete 
sentences that must be completed by choosing one of three pronouns, one of which implicates 
the self (me, myself, I). A sample item is, “The sun went in just when (we, she, I) decided to 
go out.” The measure is scored by assigning a 1 to first-person singular pronouns and a 0 to 
all other pronouns, and summing up the number of self-relevant pronouns (M = 4.29 SD = 
1.87) 
Results 
To test the hypothesis that participants with low self-esteem decrease self-state 
focussed attention when thoughts of death are activated outside of consciousness, we 
conducted regression analysis, as in Study 1. We entered mortality salience (dummy-coded) 
and mean-centered self-esteem at Step 1, and the interaction term at Step 2. At Step 1, no 
significant effects were observed (ps > .3). At Step 2, we found a significant interaction, B = -
1.30, SE = .43, t(94)  = -3.05, p = .003, adjusted R
2
 = .11 (see Figure 2). As in Study 1, 
relative to people with high self-esteem, people with low self esteem showed higher self-
focussed attention in the control condition, B = -.07, SE = .03, t(94) = -2.71, p =.008, but this 
effect was marginal in the mortality salience condition, B = -.06, SE = .03, t(94) = -1.75, p = 
.08. Critically, as in Study 1, mortality salience, relative to dentist salience, decreased self-
focussed attention at low levels of self-esteem (-1 SD), B = -1.52, SE = .54, t(94) = -2.80, p 
=.006, but not at high levels of self-esteem (+1 SD), B = .81, SE = .51, t(94)  = 1.58, p = .12 
(with the pattern of means in the opposite direction; see Figure 2).  
Discussion 
Study 2 replicated Study 1 with an alternative aversive control condition (dentist visit 
salience) and a more extensive delay. Again, in the control condition participants low in trait 
self-esteem showed higher self-focused attention than people high in self-esteem. Moreover, 
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mortality salience reduced implicit self-focused attention for people low in self-esteem 
compared to the control condition, but this did not occur for people high in self-esteem. The 
dependent measure in this study bypassed self-report and tapped into an implicit tendency to 
avoid self-related cognition, suggesting that this effect occurs at multiple levels of processing, 
and this increases the likelihood of corresponding behavioral outcomes (e.g., Asendorpf et 
al., 2002).  
The LIF used in Study 2 includes several sentences that are negatively-valenced (e.g., 
“Please don't do this to [her, us, me]; it is just not fair’’), potentially priming negative affect. 
It is possible that this may have impacted people with low self-esteem more than people with 
high self-esteem (Richter & Ridout, 2011). Study 3 was designed to rectify this shortcoming. 
Study 3 
 In Study 3 participants were asked to “translate” sentences in a foreign language and 
decide whether it contained a first person pronoun, second person pronoun, or third person 
pronoun (modelled after Davis & Brock, 1975). Consistent with past scholars (e.g., Davis & 
Brock, 1975), we reasoned that to the extent that self-related cognitions were accessible, 
participants would be more likely to determine that words were related to the self. Moreover, 
since the sentences were in a language incomprehensible to the participants, this task poses 
no potential for priming negative affect (Richter & Ridout, 2011). However, if individuals 
with low self-esteem are motivated to escape self-awareness when mortality is salient, they 
should be less likely to judge the pronouns as first person. In addition, to further establish that 
escape of self-related cognition occurs as a distal defense, we used a brief (200 milliseconds) 
supraliminal mortality prompt. Unlike in Studies 1 and 2, this mortality prime did not enable 
controlled, conscious, processing. 
Method 
Participants 
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Fifty-four English undergraduate students from the University of Kent (42 women 
and 12 men; Mage = 21) participated for credit.  
Procedure and Materials 
Again, participants first completed the Rosenberg Self-esteem Scale ( = .84; M = 
3.60, SD = .57) and some filler measures on a standard PC (equipped with Authorware 7.1 
software). Then, participants were presented with a mortality salience priming task in which 
the word “dead” was flashed briefly (200 ms) in between items on a lexical decision task. 
This basic paradigm was borrowed from Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, and Kardes’ (1986) 
work on the automatic activation of attitudes (see also, Wentura, 2000); presenting a prime 
for 200 ms in the context of a lexical decision task automatically activates the construct but is 
not enough time for controlled processing. Moreover, in contrast to Fazio et al. (1986), we 
used masked primes, substantially reducing the likelihood that the prime will be consciously 
processed (Kouider & Dehaene, 2007). Although primes of 200 ms are perceptible in 
isolation, if masked and in the context of a distraction, the majority of participants do not 
perceive such primes consciously (Dehaene & Naccache, 2001).  
Specifically, for the task, participants were informed that they would see a string of 
letters that was either a real word or not, and that a preparatory stimulus of “xxxxx”s (with 
potential other letters flashing) would appear before the actual “word” or “non-word.” They 
were instructed to decide as quickly as possible whether the string was a word or a non-word 
by pressing a “word” key (A) or a “non-word” key (6). Pressing a key removed the letter 
string from the screen. Participants were also told that the computer could remove the letter 
string before they responded so an additional task was to ‘beat’ the computer (creating 
additional time pressure, and thus, less potential for controlled processing, Wegner, 1994; no 
participants took more than the 2500 ms allocated between trails). The task involved 20 
randomly presented trials of 10 real words (e.g. ball, umbrella) and 10 non-words (e.g. hoftle, 
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satpodi). The manipulation involved presenting the word “dead,” in contrast to a string of a 
repeated letter (“oooo,” as in Fazio et al.1986), in 10 out of the 20 trials for 200 ms in the 
centre of the screen (14-pt, Callibri font), masked by “xxxxx” (14-pt, Callibri font) appearing 
for 1000 ms. Participants were given two practice trials to familiarize themselves with the 
instructions.  
We assessed mood with two simple questions about how participants felt (e.g., “How 
do you feel right now?” 1 = Worse than usual, 9 = Better than usual) ( = .87). We derived 
an average positive affect score (M = 6.09, SD = 1.09). The items introduced a short delay, 
further assuring that death thoughts were not likely to be conscious at the time of the 
dependent measure. 
Next, participants were presented with the measure of self-related cognition inspired 
by Davis and Brock’s (1975) “translation task.” The goal of the alleged translation task is to 
guess the correct pronoun in underlined parts of a number of sentences that are written in a 
foreign language (in fact, the underlined words were just random words and not necessarily 
pronouns, see Davis & Brock, 1975). The task consisted of 34 sentences in the Czech 
language, in which 49 words were underlined. For each underlined word, participants were 
asked to choose one of 15 possible pronouns, three of which were first person (me, I, and 
my). The possible total score of the number of self-related pronouns formed the dependent 
measurement of self-related cognition (M =19.91, SD = 4.24).  
Finally, we asked whether participants were familiar with the Czech language (none 
were) and whether they perceived words or flashes of words during the lexical decision task, 
and, if so, to indicate which word(s) they recognized.  
Results 
To test the hypothesis that mortality salience decreases self-related cognition for 
individuals with low self-esteem, we conducted regression analysis with mortality salience 
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(dummy coded) and self-esteem (centered) entered in the first step, followed by the 
interaction term. The sum total of first person pronouns served as the dependant measure. The 
main effect of mortality salience was not significant (ps > .7). We did observe an effect of 
self-esteem on self-related cognition, B =.21, SE =.10, t(51) = 2.12, p = .039, such that higher 
self-esteem was associated with greater first-person pronoun allocation. However, as 
hypothesized, this effect was qualified by a significant interaction, B = -.63, SE =.18, t(51) = -
3.42, p < .001, adjusted R
2
 = .22 (see Figure 3). Consistent with the hypothesis, mortality 
salience, relative to the control condition, decreased implicit self-related cognition at low 
levels of self-esteem (-1 SD), B = -3.91, SE = 1.46, t(50) = -2.69, p = .010. In contrast, 
mortality salience increased implicit self-related cognition at high levels of self-esteem (+1 
SD), B = 3.26, SE = 1.48, t= 2.20, p = .032. In addition, participants with low trait self-
esteem, relative to those with high levels of trait self-esteem, showed lower implicit self-
related cognition in the mortality salience condition B = .57, SE = .14, t(50) = 4.11, p < .001, 
but not in the neutral control condition, B = -.06, SE = .12, t(50) = -.50, p = .62.  
Of note, 76 % of the participants in the mortality salience condition reported that they 
saw either no word or a word other than “dead” in response to the manipulation check, 
suggesting that the majority of participants did not consciously attend to the prime. Further, 
controlling for whether participants reported seeing the word “dead” or excluding these 
participants did not alter any of the reported results.  
Discussion 
Study 3 extends support for our hypothesis in several ways. First, the use of a subtle 
death prime (that most participants did not consciously perceive) provides further evidence 
that self-escape for people low in self-esteem occurs as a distal (activated but not conscious) 
defense to death thoughts. In addition, the dependent measure in this study, as in Study 2, 
bypassed self-report and tapped into an implicit tendency to avoid self-related cognitions. 
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Moreover, it accomplished this in a context free of potential linguistic associations with self-
related valence or affect.  
The findings of Study 3 replicate the finding that individuals with low trait self-
esteem respond to mortality salience with efforts to escape the self. In contrast to Studies 1 
and 2, there was also a significant effect for people with high self-esteem: High self-esteem 
individuals chose to focus more on themselves when mortality was salient. Although we did 
not make this specific prediction, it makes sense that people with high self-esteem would 
cope with mortality salience by activating, or “using,” the self (Wisman, 2006). Indeed, as 
these individuals are able to self-enhance (Landau & Greenberg, 2007) when death is salient 
(e.g., Routledge et al., 2010), they should be more able to access meaningful structures to 
reduce existential self-discrepancies, as opposed to escaping the self. In contrast to the 
previous studies, we did not observe higher levels of self-related cognition for low self-
esteem individuals in the control condition; rather, we just observed lower levels in the 
mortality salience condition. 
Study 4 
Whereas the previous studies assessed the degree that self-relevant cognition was 
activated, in Study 4, we gave participants a choice to focus on the self or not, predicting that 
people low, but not high, in self-esteem will actively choose not to write about the self more 
frequently after thinking about death. Further, according to OSA theory (Duval & Wicklund, 
1972; Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1981; 1982), self-focus is aversive particular when 
discrepancies are salient (causing people to want to escape). Therefore, we hypothesized that 
when people with low self-esteem did not opt out of writing about themselves, they would 
write about themselves more negatively. 
Method 
Participants 
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Sixty-six undergraduate students from the University of Kent (44 women and 22 men, 
Mage = 21.32) participated.  
Procedure and Materials 
Participants completed the Rosenberg’s Self-esteem Scale ( = .84; M = 3.72, SD = 
.59) followed by the mortality salience manipulation used in Studies 1 and 2, or a parallel 
prompt about dental pain. After completing PANAS, (positive affect,  = .88; M = 3.30, SD = 
.79 and negative affect,  = .91; M = 2.08, SD = .83), participants were introduced to a 
“writing task” where they were asked to choose to write something about (a) themselves or 
(b) someone else. Specifically, a screen appeared with two choices: “Í would like to write 
about something that happened to me” or “I would like to write about something that 
happened to someone else.” Participants could click on their preferred choice and were then 
invited to write as much as they liked in the available blank space. The choice to write about 
the self or someone else served as the primary dependent variable.   
In addition, three coders read each essay and rate them on a 1 (entirely negative) to 5 
(entirely positive) scale (Intraclass correlation = .91; see Shrout & Fleiss, 1979). 
Results 
 To test if mortality salience predicts decreased preference for writing about oneself 
(writing about oneself was coded as ‘0’ and writing about someone else as ‘1’) for 
participants with low, but not high, self-esteem, we conducted a binary logistic regression 
analysis, in which the main effects for the experimental mortality salience manipulation 
(dummy coded) and self-esteem (centered) were entered at Step 1, followed by the interaction 
term at Step 2 (Menard, 2010). No main effects were observed (ps > .2). However, this 
logistic regression analysis revealed a significant mortality salience by self-esteem 
interaction, 2 (1, N = 65) = 4.37, p =.037, Nagelkerke R2 = .16.  
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For presentational purposes, we followed up the logistic regression with a similar 
binary logistic; but this time a median split was used to classify participants as low or high 
self-esteem (Mdn = 3.6). Consistent with the logistic regression, the 2 (mortality salience: 
high vs. low) x 2 (self-esteem: high vs. low) binary logistic analysis revealed the same 
significant mortality salience by self-esteem interaction, 2 (1, N = 65) = 4.34, p < .04, on the 
percentage of participants choosing to write about themselves. As can be seen in Figure 4, a 
smaller percentage of participants with low self-esteem chose to write about themselves in 
the mortality salience condition compared to the control condition, 2 (1, N = 34) = 4.30, p < 
.04. By contrast, high self-esteem individuals chose more often to write about themselves in 
the mortality salience condition than the control condition, but this pattern was not significant 
(p > .3). These findings support our hypothesis that participants with low self-esteem have a 
decreased preference for self-related cognition after reminders of mortality. 
We also examined the content of participants’ essays with interest in a secondary 
hypothesis, that participants with low self-esteem who chose to write about themselves would 
write more negative content under conditions of mortality salience. Therefore, we conducted 
an additional regression analysis on the valence of the content for participants who opted to 
write about themselves. The results revealed a significant interaction between mortality 
salience and self-esteem, B = -.12, SE = .06, t(44) = 2.14, p = .038, adjusted R
2
 = .08. As 
hypothesized, among participants who chose to write about themselves, mortality salience, 
relative to dental pain, increased the negativity of the essay at low levels of self-esteem (-1 
SD), B = -1.28, SE = .61, t(44)  = -2.09, p = .042, but not at high levels of self-esteem (+1 
SD), B = 39, SE = .59, t(44)  = .66, p = .51. Moreover, participants with low trait self-esteem, 
relative to those with high levels of trait self-esteem, showed more negativity in the mortality 
salience condition, B = .16, SE = .05, t(44) = 3.19, p = .003, whereas there was no effect of 
self-esteem in the control condition, B = -.03, SE = .04, t(44) = -.67, p = .50. 
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We repeated this analysis on people who chose to write about others. There were no 
main or interaction effects on the positivity of these essays (ps >. 3). Further, covarying 
length of participants’ responses did not impact any of the reported results.   
Discussion 
Consistent with, and extending, the results of Studies 1 – 3, Study 4 provided 
evidence that people low, but not high, in self-esteem respond to reminders of mortality by 
opting not to focus on the self when given an option to write about themselves or about 
others. We also examined the essays that people wrote about themselves, and consistent with 
our hypothesis, participants with low self-esteem (but not high self-esteem) wrote more 
negative essays when mortality was salient compared to the control topic. Although, the 
sample for the latter analyses was a touch small (n = 48; power = .88), these findings suggest 
that self-related cognition is relatively more aversive when mortality was salient for people 
low in self-esteem. In conjunction these results suggest that not only do people with low self-
esteem seek to avoid self-focus after mortality salience, but they seem to have good reason to 
do so; when they do not, they experience the self more negatively.  
Study 5 
  Study 5 was designed to test the impact of the existential escape hypothesis on 
behavior measured in a natural, field setting. Given the health risks associated with alcohol 
consumption (e.g., Anderson & Baumberh, 2006) and the role of escaping self-awareness in 
the desire to drink, we tested this using alcohol consumption at a nightclub. There is evidence 
that people drink alcohol, in large part, to avoid self-awareness (cf., Hull, 1981): consuming 
alcohol reduces self-awareness (Hull et al., 1983) and people drink more under conditions 
that escape is predicted by OSA theory (when they are self-aware and experience a failure, 
Hull &Young, 1983). More recent extensions of this theorizing (Steele & Josephs, 1988) 
suggest that alcohol consumption specifically impairs (or covers over) self-awareness that 
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reflects negatively on the self. In addition, alcohol consumption has been found to increase in 
response to a wide range of death-related tragedies, including terrorist attacks (Vlahov et al., 
2002) and grieving the loss of loved ones (Pilling, Thege, Demetrovics, & Kopp, 2012), and 
there is also evidence from laboratory experiments that death thoughts heighten intentions to 
binge drink (Jessop & Wade, 2010).  
Thus, it appears that existential concerns may influence people’s motivation to drink 
excessively. However, no research to date has investigated if there is a causal relationship 
between existential concerns and actual drinking behavior, and whether self-esteem would 
moderate an effect consistent with the existential escape hypothesis. We tested this by 
assigning people to write about their mortality or a control topic prior to a dance-club party 
on a university campus and, after the party, we assessed how much alcohol was consumed. 
As a logical extension of the previous four studies, we predicted that death thoughts would 
increase alcohol intake, but only for people low in self-esteem. Since participants who 
desired to consume alcohol had to go to the bar after the first part of the experiment to order a 
drink, we considered the time spent between the mortality salience prime and the alcohol 
consumption an extended delay, and as such, alcohol consumption would represent a distal 
response to thoughts of mortality. 
Method 
Participants.  
Fifty-one undergraduate students (33 women and 18 men, Mage = 20) participated in 
exchange for being entered into a raffle for, one prize of £50 (about $77),  three prizes of £15 
(about $23), and to have their £5 fee (about $7.50) for attending a nightclub party reimbursed 
upon completion of the study. Two participants did not complete all of the study materials, so 
their data was not used. 
Procedure and Materials 
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Participants planning to go to a Massive Mungos event (a student bar/nightclub that 
hosts dance events) were recruited via our RPS (Research Participant Scheme) system and a 
student recruitment service, to participate in a study on personality characteristics and club 
behavior. Participants were offered reimbursement of entrance and a chance to win monetary 
prizes as compensation for participating. Volunteers were instructed to meet in the Massive 
Mungos bar from 19:00- 21:00 prior to the actual dance event in our provisional lab that 
consisted of ten separate chairs and tables that were separated to allow for privacy.  
At the start of the first experimental session, participants completed some filler 
measures, along with the 10-item Rosenberg Self-esteem Scale ( = .80; M = 3.68, SD = 
.56). Participants were then randomly assigned to a mortality salience or a neutral (watching 
television) control condition (Greenberg et al., 1995) and then mood was immediately 
assessed using the PANAS (positive affect,  = .83; M = 3.07, SD = .76; negative affect,  = 
.78; M = 1.76, SD = .62). Following this, participants in both conditions completed a dot-to-
dot task, and we asked if they had consumed any alcohol in the past 8 hours; both were to 
implement a delay and for the purpose of identifying any prior drinking. No participants 
showed signs of alcohol consumption.  
Participants were then given a number that was written down with water resistant ink 
on their left hand. (This was done to aid in connecting Part I and Part II study materials for 
each participant). Participants were further informed that to have their £5 reimbursement they 
were expected back at the ‘lab’ (within the venue) at the latest between 1:00 am and 2:00 am 
(note that the last participant left the lab at 2:45). To help prevent suspicion, we also informed 
participants that the second part of the study would consist of more random questionnaires.  
In the second part of the study, participants were welcomed into the lab, the total time 
spent in the club was logged (M = 4.86; SD = .79; range = 3.10), and then participants’ breath 
alcohol level was administered with a breathalyser (the SD Lion). A breathalyser operates by 
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analysing the amount of alcohol concentration measured in the breath of the individual 
(BrAC), which research indicates is strongly correlated with the amount of alcohol in the 
blood (Dougherty et al., 2012). For example, 0.08 % BrAC indicates the individual to begin 
to feel the effects of alcohol, 0.35% is regarded as the drinking limit for driving and 2.17% 
refers to the stage of risk of entering a coma (Dougherty et al., 2012).  Finally, participants 
were thanked, paid and debriefed.  
Results 
To test the main hypothesis that reminders of mortality predict increased alcohol 
consumption for individuals with low, but not high, self-esteem, we once again conducted 
regression analysis with the main effects for the mortality salience (dummy coded) and self-
esteem (centered), followed by the interaction in a second step. The results revealed a main 
effect of mortality salience, indicating that reminders of mortality were associated with an 
increased level of alcohol consumption B = -.18, SE = .06, t(50) = -2.95, p = .005. In 
addition, a main effect of self-esteem emerged, such that lower levels of self-esteem were 
associated with increased levels of alcohol consumption, B = -.03, SE = .001, t(48) = -4.65, p 
< .001. These effects, however, were qualified by a significant interaction, B = .02, SE = .01, 
t(47) = 2.28, p = .027, adjusted R
2
 = .38. As predicted, mortality salience, relative to the 
control condition, increased BrAC levels at low levels of self-esteem (-1 SD), B = -0.31, SE = 
0.085, t(47)  = -3.68, p < .001, but not at high levels of self-esteem (+1 SD), B = 0.38, SE = 
0.84, t(47) = 0.45, p  > .6 (see Figure 5). In addition, participants with low trait self-esteem, 
relative to those with high levels of trait self-esteem, had higher BrAC levels in the mortality 
salience condition B = .03, SE = .01, t(47) = 4.65, p < .001, but not in the neutral control 
condition, B = -.01, SE = .01, t(47) = -1.14, p = .26. We also repeated the analyses controlling 
for the duration of time that participants spent in the club and the findings were unchanged. 
Discussion 
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Study 5 supported the existential escape hypothesis and showed that reminders of 
mortality caused individuals with low self-esteem to engage in behavior conducive to 
escaping the self. Dance-club attendees who were low in self-esteem consumed more alcohol 
by the end of the party when they had previously written about their own mortality compared 
to writing about a neutral control topic. High self-esteem club attendees did not drink more or 
less alcohol in response to the mortality prime. Consistent with the results of the first four 
studies, these findings suggest that participants were motivated to escape the self relatively 
shortly after reminders of their own mortality.  
With respect the mechanism that encouraged drinking during the course of the night, 
we suspect that the initial drinking after the reminders of mortality reduced self-control 
(Muraven, Collins, & Neinhaus, 2002) and encouraged further drinking during the night. 
However, there are alternative explanations. Participants may have made a conscious 
decision to binge drink that evening shortly after the reminders of mortality. Alternatively, 
the mortality salience manipulation may have lasted throughout the night and death thought 
accessibility may have spurred people with low self esteem to drink relatively more. Clearly, 
more research is necessary to determine the time course of existential self-escape in real life 
situations such as the one examined here. Nevertheless, these findings provide at least 
preliminary evidence that the position tested in Studies 1 through 4 extends to real world 
behavior—and indeed behavior that poses considerable health risk. 
General Discussion 
Integrating objective self-awareness theory (Duval & Wicklund, 1972; see also 
Higgins, 1987) and TMT (Greenberg et al., 1986), the existential escape hypothesis posits 
that as a distal defense against mortality salience, people low in self-esteem are driven to 
“lose the self” by avoiding self-awareness, and engage in behaviors that helps them “escape.” 
Succinctly, this should occur because they are less able to successfully employ symbolic 
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defenses against mortality awareness. Unlike people high in self-esteem, people with low 
self-esteem are less likely to enhance the self as a distal response to mortality priming 
(Landau & Greenberg, 2006), and indeed they experience heightened negative affect, and 
reduced belief that life is meaningful (Routledge et al., 2010). Belief that the self is incapable 
of being who one ideally wants to be (or ought to be), and the negative affect stemming from 
that, are crucial factor in people’s desire to self-escape (Duval & Wicklund, 1972). 
 In five studies, we found evidence in that people low in self-esteem respond to 
mortality reminders with outcomes indicative of escaping the self. Studies 1 demonstrated 
this with an explicit measure of private self-awareness, whereas Studies 2 and 3 used a more 
implicit measure of self-activation. In Study 4, in response to mortality salience, low self-
esteem people actively chose to direct their focus away from the self and toward someone 
else, and moreover, when they did focus on the self, they showed heightened negativity, 
consistent with evidence that negative affect and negative self-views go hand-in-hand with 
escape (Mor & Winquist, 2002). Finally, Study 5 demonstrated an impact on behavior 
associated with escape from the self—alcohol consumption—in a naturalistic setting. People 
low in self-esteem drank more alcohol at a nightclub subsequent to being reminded of death. 
In no study did people high in self-esteem escape when mortality was salient. Together, these 
findings indicate that people low in self-esteem, and not those high in self-esteem, respond to 
mortality reminders with decreased self-awareness and efforts to decrease it further.   
Theoretical Implications 
 The current findings advance understanding of TMT in a number of ways. Most 
basically, they depict a defense not previously conceptualized as part of TMT. In addition to 
the mortality salience hypothesis, the anxiety buffering hypothesis, and the death thought 
accessibility hypothesis, which all focus on symbolic defenses to manage the fears of death, 
these five studies provide evidence supporting the existential escape hypothesis, which 
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focuses on the arguably more direct route of avoiding self-awareness. Wisman (2006) first 
proposed the hypothesis; recently Kesebir and Pyszczynski (2011) came to similar 
conclusions, and suggested the need for research directly testing the impact of mortality 
reminders of escape behaviors. Thus, the hypothesis flows directly from TMT, and on the 
basis of this empirical evidence, suggests broadening TMT to designate escape as an 
alternative distal defense to the traditionally construed worldview and esteem-oriented modes 
of defense.     
Moreover, the research extends prior research examining escape in response to 
conscious death thought (Arndt et al., 1998) to paradigms where mortality concerns are 
clearly no longer in conscious awareness, revealing that for individuals with low self-esteem 
(only), escaping the self operates as a distal defense. In short, we suggest that escape can 
function as both a proximal and distal defense. Proximal defenses are aimed at the removal of 
death thought from consciousness. It makes sense that escaping self-awareness would 
facilitate the suppression of death though. Arndt et al. (1998)’s findings are consistent with 
this interpretation. Distal defenses to the unconscious reverberation of death thought, in 
contrast, are oriented toward the self and the meaning system in which it resides. It follows 
that here we would expect moderation by self-esteem. This distinction consistent with other 
research where self-esteem has been found to moderate distal defenses (e.g., Routledge et al., 
2010) and also with research on the terror management health model (TMHM; Goldenberg & 
Arndt, 2008) in which the same outcomes (e.g., exercise behavior) occur in response to 
conscious and non-conscious death thoughts, but only the latter are moderated by the 
relevance to self-esteem (e.g., Arndt, Schimel, & Goldenberg, 2003). 
But does escaping the self help people cope with mortality concerns similarly to other 
distal defenses? Because of the role self-awareness plays in death awareness, curtailing self-
focus should similarly mitigate the accessibility of death thoughts. But, we speculate that this 
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could be a temporary respite from death thoughts. Specifically, TMT research indicates that 
bolstering psychological structures that promote meaning, self-esteem or immortality 
eliminate death thoughts (e.g., Arndt et al., 1997). It is not clear how avoiding self-awareness, 
in itself, has any of these properties. In turn, once self-awareness occurs again following 
escape, death thoughts may again rise to the surface unless the escape involved action that 
bolsters the significance of the self or one’s worldview (e.g., by drinking alcohol someone 
gains confidence to form a new friendship). Future research should examine the impact of 
avoiding self-awareness on death thought accessibility over time. Moreover, because many 
escape behaviors (e.g., binge eating, cutting, suicide attempts, alcohol and drug use) are 
likely to perpetuate negative self-views (e.g., Baumeister, 1991) (in addition to destructive 
health consequences), escaping the self in response to mortality salience could perpetuate the 
desire to subsequently escape even more in the future. 
Finally, these studies may additionally shed light on the paradox of self-esteem: 
While there is evidence that people with high self-esteem are less defensive in response to 
mortality reminders (Harmon-Jones et al., 1997), there is also accumulating evidence that 
they are more so (Baldwin & Wesley, 1996; Hirschberger, Florian, & Mikulincer, 2002; 
Landau & Greenberg, 2006). For example, it is the people with high self-esteem that identify 
with esteem-relevant (e.g., the body) aspects of the self in response to mortality salience 
(Goldenberg & Shackelford, 2005). In our Study 3 individuals with high self-esteem 
responded with an increase in self-related cognition, and in the majority of studies there were 
trends in this direction. To the extent that people with high explicit self-esteem are able to 
activate meaningful self-related structures in response to mortality salience (explaining why 
they would be insulated somewhat from the repercussions of death thought), it makes sense 
that people high in self-esteem have more to lose and defend with respect to the self. Future 
research is necessary to continue to tease apart the variables that impact when people with 
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high self-esteem defend more and when they defend less, but the current findings provide 
insight into a mechanism— the operative motive to “use” or “lose” the self—that can help 
reconcile these divergent findings concerning the moderating role of self-esteem. 
Implications for Health Behavior  
Recognizing the conditions under which people will seek to escape the self has 
implications for health behavior, and the TMHM (Goldenberg & Arndt, 2008) in particular. 
One widely supported proposition of the TMHM is that people become more willing to risk 
their health when death thoughts are activated, but not conscious, if health risk behaviors 
provide the individual with self-esteem. For instance, people who derive self-esteem from 
tanning actually become more likely to tan and less likely to use sunscreen in response to 
mortality salience (e.g., Routledge et al., 2004). The current findings suggest, however, that 
health decisions in response to mortality reminders may also be influenced by the desire to 
escape self-awareness. Thus, in addition to drinking more alcohol in response to a mortality 
reminder, people with low self-esteem may be more likely to choose to engage in any number 
of behaviors (e.g., drug use, binge eating, smoking, even cutting) that are conducive to 
escaping self-awareness (Feldman, 1988; Hull et al., 1983; Stein et al., 2007). It also follows 
that health behaviors that require a focus on the self, such as looking in the mirror for a skin 
self-exam, or even going to a doctor for a check-up, or with a specific health concern, may be 
avoided by individuals with low self-esteem to the extent that thoughts of death are accessible 
(which is likely in the context of such health situations, Goldenberg & Arndt, 2008). Thus, it 
is not just the implications of behavior for self-esteem, but for self-awareness, that are 
relevant to health decision made in the context of accessible death thoughts.   
 The most extreme decision a person could make with respect to their health, to 
commit suicide, has been argued to be driven by a desire to escape self-awareness 
(Baumeister, 1991). Chatard and Selimbegovi (2011) demonstrated empirically that 
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
Great Escape     33 
 
providing evidence that individuals are falling short of important standards increases the 
accessibility of suicide-related thoughts. Other research indicates that suicide is preceded by 
negative changes in affect (Maris, 1981; at least prior to deliberating seriously about suicide, 
at which point a person presumably loses affect altogether, Baumeister, 1991), and by the 
perception that life is meaningless (Harlow, Newcomb & Bentler, 1986). Low self-esteem 
individuals escape when mortality is salient (current studies), and exhibit heightened negative 
affect, and reduced belief that the world is meaningful (Routledge et al., 2010), when 
mortality is salient. This suggests that for individuals with low self-esteem, death thoughts 
could exacerbate suicide risk, in so far as suicide facilitates escaping the self (Chatard & 
Selimbegovi, 2011, did not find increased suicide-thought accessibility in response to a 
mortality prime, Study 1, but they did not examine the interaction between priming death and 
self-esteem). Such reasoning not only provides a theoretical answer to the question of why 
people would ever consider suicide if they are motivated to avoid mortality concerns (raised 
by Muraven & Baumeister, 1997; Heine, Proulx, & Vohs, 2006; Chatard & Selimbegovic, 
2011 as criticism of TMT), but provides a working model to test an interplay of factors that 
may promote suicide risk. We hasten to add, however, that someone actively considering 
suicide may respond very differently to thoughts of death than a person in a psychological 
experiment, and thus mixed methods research is recommended (Kral, Links, & Bergmans, 
2011) before conclusions can be drawn. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
 This research is not without limitations. First, it would be ideal to pit alternative 
defenses against one another in the context of a single experiment. Although we articulated a 
“lose” or “use” strategy for coping with mortality concerns, our studies were designed with 
“lose” scenarios in mind. It would be useful to provide opportunities for self-esteem—
reducing the discrepancy—in conjunction with escaping the self and see if people high in 
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self-esteem consistently take the former route, and if people with low self-esteem are 
undeterred from escape. And, although Study 5 took a leap out of the laboratory and into a 
naturalistic context (a nightclub), additional research should extend the population beyond 
college students and test additional behaviors.  
Finally, this research was limited to assessing outcomes as a function of individual 
differences in explicit trait self-esteem. Some research suggests that high implicit self-esteem 
confers the anxiety buffering properties that help to manage the awareness of mortality 
(Schmeichel et al., 2009); people with low implicit self-esteem may lack the ability to 
automatically access positive self-related frameworks that can aid terror management (Yang, 
Guan, Dedovic, Qi, & Zhang, 2012). Since the inability to generate meaningful and positive 
self-related structures (unconscious or conscious) is at the heart of self-escape, it is possible 
that implicit low self-esteem promotes existential self-escape (for a broader discussion see 
Schmeichel et al., 2009). This, and whether the impact of low explicit and low implicit self-
esteem are additive when escaping under mortality salience, are matters for future research. 
In a similar vein, it is feasible that comparable effects would be observed as a function of a 
(either explicit or implicit) self-esteem manipulation. Additional research using such a 
paradigm would be helpful as a means of developing strategies to curtail reactions to 
mortality reminders that are rooted in potentially detrimental efforts to escape the self.  
Concluding Remarks 
Becker argued that the capacity for self-awareness sets human beings apart from other 
animals, ushering in not only significant cultural advancement but also an awareness of 
mortality. A substantial literature (e.g., Baumeister, 1991) and observation of human 
behavior—“drinking, drugging (shopping) himself out of awareness” (Becker, 1973)—
depicts efforts to escape this self-awareness. Drawing on Becker, TMT, OSA theory, and 
previous theorizing (Wisman, 2006), the current perspective tested and provided evidence 
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supporting the existential escape hypothesis. Five studies demonstrated an empirical, causal 
link between non-conscious mortality concerns and escaping the self for people low in self-
esteem—both self-reported and behaviorally, inside and outside of the laboratory. It is our 
hope that an understanding of existential escape can be used to spur research aimed at 
improving physical and mental health, as well as inspire continued empirical advances in the 
domain of self-regulation and beyond. 
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Footnotes 
1. For all reported studies, we report all data exclusions and all included measurements in 
text, in accordance with journal policy. Sample size was determined using an end of 
semester stopping point (Studies 1, 3, 4 and 5) and/or using a planned sample size 
(Studies 2) that would provide at least 80% power based on the average effect size of .35 
(based on an average effect size found across hundreds of studies priming mortality; see 
Burke et al., 2010). At no point were additional data collected after data were initially 
analyzed 
2. The effect of the MS X self-esteem interaction on positive and negative affect was not 
significant in any of the five studies; though in Study 2 there was a marginal effect (p = 
.07; higher self-esteem associated with more positive affect under MS). Critically, in all 
studies, the MS X self-esteem interaction remained significant when controlling for 
positive and negative affect, suggesting that the effects are not accounted for by changes 
in self-reported affect.  
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